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ABSTRACT
This paper is an

attempt to assess the patterns

of bureaucratic-military relationships which developed
during the period of military government in Ghana and
Nigeria following the oouns d'etat of 1966* It was
found that the patterns differed between the two count
ries. In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military worked
closely together during the entire period of military
government. In Nigeria, the military and the bureauc
racy worked closely during the first period of military
rule, but the bureaucracy was replaced in governing
positions by political figures in the military government that took over after the second coun»
It is suggested that the difference in patterns
of military-bureaucratic relations was due primarily
to the attitudes held by the military toward politics
and politicians. It is further suggested

that the

difference in attitudes was due to three factors:
1 ) patterns of alienation of the military and
the bureaucracy which developed during the

pre-coup period;
2 ) the events of the immediate post-coup period;
3 ) the type of problems facing the military
governments.
11 i
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Of these , it appears that the latter was the most import
ant factor in the determination of the differing atti
tudes of the military toward politics and politicians.

IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ghana and Nigeria experienced coups d *etat in
1966 which resulted in military governments replacing
civilian governments in both countries. Although in
each case the obvious effect of the coup was to remove
the civilian politicians from power, it is less clear
what changes took place in the relationships between
the remaining leadership groups. It is the purpose of
this paper to examine the relationships which existed
in both Ghana and Nigeria between the military, political
and bureaucratic leadership groups prior to the coup,
and attempt to assess the impact that the changes in
regime brought about by the coups had on the relation
ships between the key elite groups during the period
of military government.
This examination will be carried out chrono
logically. First, the paper will examine the patterns
of interaction between the political and bureaucratic
leadership and between the political and military
leadership prior to the coups in Ghana and Nigeria.
The purpose is to point out influences or patterns of
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action which might contribute to the establishment of
a close co-operation between the military and the
bureaucracy. Second, the paper will focus on the
patterns of interaction between the military and the
bureaucracy which occurred after the removal of the
political leadership by the coups in an attempt to
determine the

similarities suid differences between

these patterns of bureaucratic-military interaction
in Ghana and Nigeria. In this context, the paper will
examine the relationships in two time periods:

(1)

during the first six months after the coup; and (2)
in the more formal period of military government
which followed this initial six month period. Here
the discussion will trace the development of relation
ships in these countries as conditions stabilized,
and will attempt to point out how both the events of
the initial period and the subsequent problems faced
by the military governments contributed to the de
velopment of the relationships.
While there have been numerous studies focus
ing on the role of the military or the bureaucracy in
political development, the importance of the relationships between the groups, and the determinants of
these relationships, has not generally been stressed.
Ghana and Nigeria present two instances where the
development of bureaucratic-military relations in
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Dost-couD

military governments may be studied.

In each country, a definite pattern of bureaucraticmilitary relations developed. Since the patterns were
quite different, it will be the purpose of this paper
to explain how these differences occurred.
In general, the major reasons given for the
close co-operation between the military and the bur
eaucracy have emphasized the common background and
attitudes of the two groups. Some of these specific
binding ties mentioned have been: 1) that the military
and the bureaucracy represent the most westernized
and professional groups in the society; 2) that in
ex-British colonies, both groups were British-trained
and thus influenced by common professional social
ization patterns; and 3) that both groups have similar
1

attitudes towards politics and politicians. The
first two propositions appear to be supported by the

1
Among numerous authors reflecting these
viewpoints are:
S.P. Huntingdon,Political Order in Changing
Societies(New Haven:Yale University Press,1969lChT4
A.Perlmutter,"The Praetorian State and the
Praetorian Army ‘*Coiapar a t Ive Fo 1it îc o 1 (3, 1 9 6 9 )n.‘
^P,h
F. Heady, Public Administration:a Comparative
Perspective (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
19%6)pp77-78.
L.G. Cowan,"The Military in African Politics"
International Journal XXI(3,i96o)p293
E. Feit,"Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria"
World Politics XX(1,1967) nassim.
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close working relationship which developed in both
Ghana and Nigeria during the immediate post-coup
period, but fail to account for the subsequent diff
erences in patterns of relations which developed.
The third proposition, that of common attitudes to
ward politics and politicians is likewise important,
but it is important in the fact that different atti
tudes existed especially on the part of the military
in the two countries.
Attitudes toward politics and politicians
on the part of Ghanaian and Nigerian military offi
cers differed in two crucial respects ; 1 ) in the
level and uniformity of alienation felt toward the
political

structures; and 2 ) in the degree to which

political and bureaucratic groups were to be permit
ted to participate in the military government. These
crucial attitudinal differences were not solely the
product of pre-coup relationships between the three
groups, but were also affected by the events of the
actual removal of the civilian regimes and the subse
quent initial periods of military government, and
perhaps more importantly, by the nature of the pol

itical problems which faced the military once they
had assumed power.
The different types of military-bureaucratic
relationships which developed in Ghana and Nigeria
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following the eouos are clearly the result of a number
of causal factors. In an attempt to explain the dif
ferences in these relationships, this paper will
focus on three major areas* 1) the development of
attitudes on the part of the military and the bureau
cracy toward the political sphere during the precoup period; 2) the way in which the actual events
of the COUPS and the immediate post-cpup period effected
the availability of various groups to participate in
the military governments; and 3) the manner in which
the differing political problems confronting the
military governments of Ghana and Nigeria were reflected
in the pattern of relationships which developed.
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CHAPTER II
PRE-COUP INFLUENCES ON
BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY

RELATIONS

In Ghana and Nigeria, the civilian bureau
cracy and the military reflect both the influences
of colonial background and the experiences of these
institutions during the period of national independ
ence* This chapter will examine some of the effects
of these influences in the pre-coup period on the
military and the bureaucracy as institutions and on
the relationships between the two groups,
Prior to Ghana’s independence, the structure
of colonial government ensured the close co-opera
tion between the civil service and the security forces
2
of the colony* Within the colonial structure, both
the colonial bureaucracy and the security forces, as
the only organized structures, were implicitly charged

2

Throughout this paper, the terms security forces
and military will be used interchangably to mean both
the military per se and the police as a para-military
unit. For the rationale of including the police in the
military, see J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order
(Londons Institute of Strategic Studies,I9 6 9 )pp28-31,65-70.
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7
with the maintenance of colonial security, both internally and externally. Both carried out the role
of policy-application agencies, implementing the
directives of the colonial hierarchy. In addition,
they acted together to maintain internal security,
with the civil service fulfilling the intelligence
gathering role, and the security services the inves
tigative and control functions. Thus within the prime
role of system maintenance, the two services were
3
forced to work closely together.
The same basic pattern was reflected in Ni
geria, but one special problem arose which mitigated
the chances of the same close relationship developing,
Prior to 1951» the colonial civil service in Nigeria
had been a unified service, fulfilling the same sec
urity maintenance role as had the civil service in
Ghana. As a unified service, there was a fluidity of
the movement of personnel between regions, which permitted the possibility of ethnic clashes. This was
due both to the prevalence of southerners in the
civil service, a result of the merit system of re~
eruiting, and to the stated policy of not allowing
civil servants native to one region to work in their
3
On the primacy of the maintenance role, see
A.L.Adu, The Civil Service in Commonwealth AfricafLondom
Allen and Unwin,1969)Ch,l.
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8
home region. With the formation of the federal system
in 1951» the well-developed educational system around
Onitsha led to an increase in the number of Easterners
entering the civil service

of the central government,
4
as well as the western and northern civil services.
The process of decolonization had major effects
on both the roles and structures of the bureaucracy
and the military in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, the
process resulted in

altering

the functions and goals

of both these structures, and in the necessity of
Africanizing the two groups. In Nigeria, the process
also led to changes in goals and functions, as well
as Africanization, with the additional problem that
the federal nature of Nigeria required the repatriation of posts to citizens native to the region(termed
northernization, westernization,easternization or
regionalization).
In both the military and the civil service
in Ghana, the movement toward independence meant an
increase in the demands by Africans for major roles
within the institutions of the country. To satisfy
these demands,

and to enable the country to control

4
D.J. Kingsley,"Bureaucracy and Political
Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria" in
J . Lapalombara(ed) Bureaucracy and Political Develop
ment (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,I963)
pp.311-313.
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its own civil service and military, the process of
Africanization was expanded. The Ghanaian goal was
complete repatriation of the positions concerned by
1957* This process had begun in 1946 with the aboli
tion of the favoured racial basis in the civil serv
ice, and was extended in 1949 by the cessation of
5
expatriate recruiting for the administrative services.
In the military, the process of Africanization of
officer positions started during the Second World War,
with some Ghanaians being granted temporary commi
ssions. However, the first permanent,or Queen *s,comm
issions were not granted until 194?, while a regular
officer’s school was not formed until the Teshie

6
school was formed in 1953» By 1957» 12.8% of the
7
officer corps was Ghanaian , while complete African
ization was finally attained in 19&3. The Africani
zation process in the civil service progressed from
1 3 .8% of the senior service African in 1949 to 38.2%

8
in 1954, with almost complete Africanization by i9 6 0 .

A.L. Adu, Civil Services, p .131
6
Lee, African Armies p.41
7
ibid, p.44

8
D. Austin, Politics in Ghana. 1947-1960 (London:
Oxford University Press,Tq^4jpV365
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10
In Nigeria, the process of Africanization
dates from the 1952 appointment of a Nigerianization
9
Commission, and their recommendations in 1953» By
1957» a Nigerianization Officer had been appointed
to accelerate the recruiting and training of Niger
ians for the public services. In 1959?however, a
committee of the House of Representatives adversely
reported on the work of this officer because, among
other reasons, only 10 of 73 superscale posts were
10
Nigerianized, By I96I, however, the rate of Nigerian
ization in the federal service had increased greatly,
with 64% of the senior posts being filled by Nigerians
in 1 9 6 2 . Because of this increase, Nigerianization
ceased to be regarded by the public service commiss11

ion as a problem of major concern to the legislators.
In Nigeria, the removal of expatriates was slower
than in Ghana, due to a policy which created nev/
posts for these expatriate advisors, mostly in tech-

9
Taylor Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition" in
R.O.Tilman and T.Cole(eds) Nigerian Political Scene
(Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press,1962)p,104
10

Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition" p.l05
Superscale posts include those of Permanent Secre
tary, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Senior Assist
ant Secretary, the top three levels of the Civil Service.
11

Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition"p.I05
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11
nical fields and in the northern region, where the
political leaders preferred expatriates to southern
Nigerians.
Table I
Progress of Nigerianization
At Permanent Secretary Level
Region

Eastern

1958

Northern

1 of 11

1959

3 of 13

1961

11 of 13

1963

Western

__

11 of 11

_13_qf 13_

1 of 11
4 of 11

Although the above table includes only the
permanent secretary level, it is apparent that the
rate of progress was substantial in the eastern and
western regional services. At lower levels(superscale
and scale A salary grades), over half of the 558 posts
in the eastern regional service had been held by
expatriates in 1952* By I96I, only 92 expatriates
remained. In the north, the pace of progress was
slower because of the demands for Northernization
rather than Nigerianization. At the superscale level,
of 100 posts, only 38 were held by Nigerians in 19&3,
while 33 were held by expatriates,

and the remaining

29 posts were vacant. At the federal level, the pace
of Nigerianization was fairly slow until i960. At
that time, only 32% of the superscale posts were held
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12
by Nigerians. Ey I963, however, Nigerians held 77%
12
of these posts, with the rest held by expatriates.
Within the Nigerian military, the first Queen's
Commissions were granted to Nigerians in 194?, and
by i960, 15.1% of the officer corps had been Nigerianized. This slow rate was the result of demands by
the federal structure for the maintenance of an eth
nic balance in the officer corp. These demands meant
that suitable candidates could only be admitted within
13
their regional quota.
With the low number of northern
Nigerians applying, this meant a slow rate of growth
of the Nigerian officer corp. By January,I96I, three
months after independence, there were only eightyone Nigerian officers, an increase of twenty-four,
but still a small number compared to the more than
eight hundred expatriate officers. The formation of
officers schools in the north helped to redress the
balance, and increase the number of officers in the
military.

By I965» the majority of the officer corps

12

Data from : Kingsley,"Bureaucracy and Poli
tical Development" pp310-311; A.Adedeji,"Training
for What?:a Review of the Development and Problems of
Administrative Training in Africa" Public Administr
ation 47(4,1969)pp454-457
13
See V.C. Ferkis,"The Role of the Public Serv
ices in Nigeria and Ghana" in P. Heady and S. Stokesfeds)
Papers in Comparative, Public Administration(Ann Arbor:
Institute of Public Administration,1962)pp202-203
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15
was Nigerian, with expatriates still serving in
14

staff and training positions on a contract basis.
The changes in role and function of the
civil service and the military also affected the
future relations between the two groups. In both
Ghana and Nigeria, the approach of independence
meant the imposition of a political superstructure

15
on the existing institutions.

This resulted in

a change in the character of the roles of the in
stitutions from one of a static,systems-maintenance
16
nature to one of a dynamic, supportative nature.
This change resulted in an alteration of priorities.
Under the colonial system, t h ^ primary function of
these

institutions was one of service of the col

onial office, and was priamrily one of rule applica
tion. During the shift to an independent state(occuring in Ghana between 1951 and 1957, and in Nigeria
between 1954 and 1960), the priorities changed to the
14 .
W.M. Gutteridge, The Military in African
Politic5(London:Methuen, 1969)pp69-7l'
15
See D.Apter, Ghana_in Transition(New York:
Methuen,1965) and P. Blitz(ed.) Government and P olitics
in Nigeria(London:Sweet and Maxwell,1 9 0 5 ) "for goherai
treatments of this process.
16
See M. Fainsod,"Bureaucracy and Modernization:
The Russian and East European Case" in J. LaPolambara(ed)
Bureaucracy and Political Development pp.256-257 regard
ing the dynamic supportative role.
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service of the government, and by extension, of the
people, becoming more multi-functional with the
addition of new departments, and changes to the scope
1?
of old departments.
This alteration required the
inclusion of highly-educated young men in the two
institutions, bringing with them different conceptions
of the role of the public services in the two countries.
The effects of Africanization and changes in
role and functions of the military and the bureaucracy
are easily shown. The rapid pace of Africanization
compounded by changes in the structures and functions
of the governments of these states prior to independence
required an immediate injectfoh of new,educated young
men into the upper levels of both public services.
These men, entering the public service, either military
or civil, came into contact with senior ranks who had
been trained and socialized in the patterns of the
British model. Further, the pre-independence mainenance
of British standards meant, for the military, further
training at military Schools in England, and conformance
to the standards of these schools. For the bureaucrat,
entry into an expatriate-dominated bureaucracy meant
compliance with the standards of the expatriate.

17
R.L. Harris,"Effects of Political Change on
the Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria"
Administrative Science Quarterly 15(5,1968) pp586-404
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15'
In both cases, the results

were that observance of high

standards of professional conduct were required of these
future elite members, and were adopted by these members,
as their own standards.

The common standards of pro-

fessionalism acted as the basis for future relations
between elite groups.
Following independence both the bureaucratic
and the military elites in Ghana and Nigeria were
forced into patterns of action which did not conform
to the standards adopted during the pre-independence
period.

In Ghana, this was mainly the result of

political structure, while in Nigeria, it may be traced
to problems of regionalism and ethnicity.
In Ghana, the Congress People's Party,

(O.P.P.)

led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, gained the position of
government party during the colonial period, and,
when elected Prime Minister, Nkrumah led Ghana to indep
endence.

The basic British structures were maintained,

but during the entire period of Nkrumah's rule, the
base of political and social activity was located within
the O.P.P..

As Bretton noted, this political machine

built by Nkrumah "hollowed out the existing Structure
(of state institutions) then proceeded to crush the
18
remaining shell".
This was done by altering the

18
(New York:

H. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah
Praeger, 1933T p p T 6-7 .
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16.
political structure, uniting the positions of head of
state and head of government in the office of president
by proclaiming a republican constitution in 196O.

By

this constitution, all structures of government were
subordinated to the president.

To complete this move,

the creation of a single-party state in January 1964
vested all powers in the life chairman of the C.P.P.,
who also happened to be president.
These constitutional changes and amendments had
two basic effects on the civil service.

By the constit

ution of i960, "the appointment, promotion, dismissal
and disciplinary control of members of the public
19
service is vested in the president."
This article
had the effect of opening the service as a source of
patronage, with the Civil Service Commission stripped
of all influence.

In addition, the merit basis of

the service v/as removed, allowing for political appointment
and promotion within the civil service.

This allowed

the meshing of the C.P.P. and the civil service at all
levels.

The bureaucracy became an extension of the

president’s office, reduced to "mere administrative
20
mentalities" of the presidency. . The informal structure

19
Article 51» Section 2 of the Republican
Constitution. For the full text, see Apter, Ghana
in Transition Appendix A.

20
Bretton, Rise and Fall, p. 10?.
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17.
of the C.P.P. within the civil service became the
means for enforcing the president’s wishes upon all
levels of the service, and also became the upward channel
of communication to the president’s office.
The bureaucrats were removed entirely from the
formulation of policy.

Policies were made on the

basis of highly personalized, ad hoc decisions by the
president’s office, with the bureaucrats reduced to the
role of programming and executing the policies handed
to them.

If it was possible for bureaucrats to be

purely administrative, then the role performed by
Ghana’s senior bureaucrat; under Nkrumah’s regime
21
came close to being so.
For 'bureaucrats trained and
educated in the British tradition, and who would have
accepted British standards, this could only have resulted
22
in the bureaucrats becoming opposed to the C.P.P..
Because of this opposition, many trained administrators
chose to leave Ghana, preferring to work for international
organizations rather than the C.P.P..
However, most bureaucrats chose to remain in
Ghana, working within the restricted role allowed them
by the political machine.

Nkrumah allowed the profess-

21

Harris, "Effects of Political Change" p. 393.

22
Bretton, Rise and Fall Chapter VI and Harris,
'Effects of Political Change" pp. 392-393*
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18.
ional civil servants in the npper levels of the hureancracy to disregard the Party, and perform these limited
functions, for it was in this way that he hoped to
23
isolate the powerful members of a group he distrusted.
Until I9 &O, the military had been fairly free
of political interference. From 196O until the coup,
however, the security services were continually alienated
by Nkrumah. In July,i9 6 0 , the power to make all military
appointments was granted to the president by the new
constitution.

Closely following this event came the

involvement of Ghana in the Congo Crisis.These have
been generally accepted as the starting points for the
deterioration of relations between the president and the
25
army.
Relations between the police and the president
generally seem to have deteriorated from August,1962,
until the coun in February I9 6 6 . Nkrumah, who was convinced

23
Bretton, Rise and Fall, pp.11^-117
2k
Within the context of this paper, the termaalienation is used to refer to the process by which persons
or groups become disaffected. That is,the process by
which a neutral or active support group or person is
changed into a gro'up or person in conflict with the
source of discord. In this case, it means the process
by which the military and the bureaucracy wore dis
affected by the political regime. In this paper, alien
ation, disaffection and estrangement will be used
interchangably to refer to this process.
25
Gutteridge, Military in African Politics.p.100
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that the security branch was no longer reliable after
an attempt on his life in August, decided to form a
national security service responsible to the president
26
only. This move humiliated the police,
and a second
attempted assassination by a police constable led
Nkrumah to purge the top ranks of the police.
The army was faced with a similar situation.
The formation of a Bureau of Military Intelligence in
1961 under the command of a diplomat, transferred to the
military with the rank of lieutenant-Colonel, aroused
27
considerable resentment in the army.
The appointment
of this former diplomat, a fellow tribesman and friend
of the president, meant that informants linked to the
presidential security system were being introduced.
Additionally, the formation of the President's Own
Guard Regiment(s) (P.O.G.R.), an elite force composed
of volunteer Ghanaians under the direct control of the
president extended the army's resentment, especially
since the P.O.G.R, were advised by east Europeans, in
contrast to the British orientation of the rest of the
army.

As well, these regiments were given the best

equipment and uniforms while the regular army was poorly
26
Bee, African Armies p. 6 ^.
27
A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coun (New York,
Humanities Press, I9 6 6 ) pp. 100-102,
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28
clothed and supplied.
The formation of this independent parallel
system thus alienated the existing security forces,
by posing a threat to the traditions of the services
involved.

These traditions were further threatened by

the continuing politicizing moves by the president who
required all officers to be members of the C.P.P.,
and all officers to attend the party ideological institute
at Vfinneba.
In Ghana, both the military and the civilian
bureaucracy were alienated by the political superstructure.
The bureaucracy was supplanted by the party apparatus,
while the military position was reduced by the imposition
29
of parallel structures, both actual and embryonic.
In each case, the role which the institution was
expected to play was less than the role which the members
of the respective elites considered proper.

Thus two

alienated groups existed, the regular military and the
civil service.

These groups could co-operate on the

basis of this alienation, and on the common standards
of the groups.
In Nigeria, the basic situation differed greatly

28
Afrifa, The Ghana Coun passim.
29
Gutteridge, Militarv in African Politics,
p. 105» The *embryonic groupé'refers to the Worker's
Brigade and the Young Pioneers, who could be used by the
C.P.P. as enforcers.
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21.
from that of Ghana,
in the Federation.

There existed no one dominant party
This made it improbable that the

institutions of the bureaucracy and the military would
be politicized by the actions of a single person or group.
There could be no creation of parallel structures to
extend personal influence into the lower levels of these
institutions.
In Nigeria, the government of each region was
in the hands of a dominant, tribally-based political
party.

The central government, however, was controlled

by a coalition of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.)
30
and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.)
Between January I965 and the coun in January I9 6 6 ,
the central government was controlled by a national
coalition embracing all four major parties.

The regional

power base of each party provided the opportunity for
each party to maintain control by the purchase power
of public funds, jobs, contracts, licenses, etc..

The

bureaucracy was limited to programme formulation and
management, and the role of policy advisor.

However,

this latter role was circumscribed by the political
dominance of the party in the region.

Additionally,

30
The other major parties included:
the
Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), west and
mid-west regions;
The Action Group (A.G.) western region;
the Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.) an
N.C.N.C. ally in the north. — .
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the rate of political interference in programme management
was fairly high, since the prime aim of the programmes
became a source of patronage.

This had been the situation

since before independence, and had become so blatant
31
that commissions of investigation were initiated.
In the regions, the boundaries of bureaucratic respon
sibility were highly circumscribed by the unwillingness
of political entities to surrender the opportunity for
32
political and personal gain.
In the central government, the respective
compositions of the political and bureaccratic elites
led to the same circumscription of responsibilities.
Where northerners dominated the political structure,
and easterners dominated the bureaucratic structure
there appeared to be a formality of communication
between the minister and the higher civil servants.
While the political decisions would be supported, there
appeared to exist on the part of the ministers a tendency
to work around rather than through the senior bureaucrats,
33
thus reducing the role of the bureaucrat.
31
Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition" nassim.
32
R.B. Harris "Role of the Civil Servant in West
Africa" Public Administration Review, 29 (December,
1 9 6 5 ) pp. 30G-3 1 3 .
33
V.A. Olorunsola "Patterns of Interaction between
Bureaucratic and Political leaders:
A Case Study"
Journal of Dcvcloninv Areas III (k, I9 6 8 ) pp. 5I-6 6 .
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23In both the central and regional governments,
it has been suggested that the bureaucracy was alienated
by the tendency on the part of the political elite
to by-pass the bureaucrat.

This suggestion rests on

the assumption of inter-tribal competition or distrust.
Thus in the central government, the positions of the
northern politician and the eastern bureaucrat would lead
to this situation.

In the west and midwest and eastern

states, the competition would be lessened due to the
34
tribal matching of politician and bureaucrat.
In Nigeria, military alienation was not as
manifest as it had been in Ghana;

however, the regional

basis of parties implied a competition for the support
of the military.

Tensions within the army existed

between northern and southern officers as early as I96I,
This demonstrated the intrusions of political-ethnic
considerations into the army, which would tend to
alienate those trained or educated in the British
36
pattern and who had accepted British standards.
The primary ethnic ties of the members of the military
elite allowed the extension of political competition
34
Olorunsola, "Patterns*'

pp. 64-66.

35
Bee, African Armies,' p. ??.
36
Nigeria"
p. 2 5 9 »

P. Herring "The Future of Democracy in
in Tilman and Cole, Nigerian Political Scene
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into the military.

Identification would therefore be

not with the federal government, but with regional
parties.

It appears that this problem may have been

magnified by the quota system of recruitment which
may have encouraged close regional ties.
While not as overt as the Ghanaian situation,
the Nigerian situation before the coup still led to a
partial alienation of both the bureaucracy and the military.
The regional identification, corruption and political
stagnation of the independence period would have
alienated these groups which were trained to expect
high standards.

As in Ghana, the bureaucracy filled

a reduced role, one in which an administrator would
feel handicapped.

The use of the military to solve

internal political problems in the mid-west would only
37
have led to a lack of confidence in the politicians.
Finally, the police had been exhausted and confused in
38
their attempt to control the break-down in the west.
To generalize, by the end of I965» the military
and the civil bureaucracy in both Ghana and Nigeria
had been alienated by the holders of political power
37
Lee, African Armies p. 168.
38
It is noticable, however, that the police
were considered a truly national force in 1968 and I969
at the peace talks between the Federal Military Govern
ment and the secessionist eastern region, as noted in
Africa Report for 1968-1 9 69 .
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25in their respective countries.

In both countries, these

alienated groups could co-operate on the basis of their
alienation and on the basis of their British standards.
Additionally, the common structural features of the two
institutions meant the small elites of these two groups
were easily identifiable, and the implications of high
positions in these structures would instil confidence
in the abilities of the holders of these positions.
The stage was therefore set for the coups.
The military, disaffected by the imposition of political
norms on its basically non-political standards, with a
self-image as the protector of the state, could move
to correct this disaffection.

The bureaucracy, on the

other harid, circumscribed and partially politicized,
could only retreat into routine, waiting to take its
proper role in the administration of the state.
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CHAPTER III

EFFECTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
ON BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS

In addition to the varied patterns of alien
ation which had developed in Ghana and Nigeria, both
the act of deposing the civilian regimes and the pro
blems encountered by the military governments in the
period immediately following the coups likewise con
tributed to the development of different patterns of
bureaucratic-military relationships. The events of the
COUPS influenced the ability of various leadership
groups to participate in the subsequent military gov
ernment. Possibly more important, however, to the dif
ferences in patterns of relationships were the events
of the immediate post-coup period.
In the COUP of February 24,1966, the Ghanaian
military acted as a unified group to topple the
Nkrumah regime. Planned and executed by the security
forces, the take-over of power was accomplished with
a minimal loss of life, and minimal disruption of
26
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routine. The credit for the planning of the coup was

39
claimed by many groups and individuals,

but it now

appears clear that the coun w as the work of four men:
Colonel E.K.Kotoka of the Army and Commissioner J.W.K.
Harley of the Police, assisted by Major A.A,Afrifa
and Colonel A.Ocran, commander of the Accra Garrison.
The date chosen was after President Nkrumah's depart
ure for a trip to Hanoi and Peking, because it was
40
assumed that his absence would minimize the bloodshed.
The mechanics of the coun were fairly direct.
In order to mislead the informers of the Security
Branch, an exercise was planned for February 23rd on
the pretext of practising for the invasion of Rodesia.
The battalion at Tamale moved to join the brigade at
Kumasi. On the evening of February 2 3 , the brigade
moved to Accra and, in the early hours of the morning
of the 24th, attacked and captured the radio station
and other key points in Accra, There was little resist
ance except from the P.O.G.R. at Flagstaff House
(Nkrumah's residence) and this was quickly put down.
41
Only seven of the attacking force were killed, as
was General C.M. Barwah, the General Officer Commanding
39
See Daily Times (bagos) Feb. 27,28,1966.
40
W.M. Gutteridge, The Militarv in African Politic:
(London:Methuen,1969)p-i09'
41
See Ghana Today, Feb.24,196?.
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Ghanaian Forces, who had refused to support the Icad42
ers of the caup.
By 6:00 A.M., Colonel Kotoka
announced over the radio that "the myth surrounding
Nkrumah has been broken.

Headquarters were establ

ished at the police station, and an effective govern
ment with General A. Ankrah at its head established.
In the Nigerian case, the original assump
tion of power by the military on January 15-1 6,1 9 66
can scarcely be called a coup d'etat. In form, it
appeared more a mutiny of some officers in Kaduna,
Ibidan and Lagos. The timing of the move was such
that these 'plotters* in Kaduna were able to kill
Sir Amhadu Bello, the northern Premier^ 8.A. Akintola,'
the western FPemier, and Brigadier Ademulegun, one
of the more senior Nigerian officers, and were able
to arrest the northern regional Governor, In Lagos,
seven people, including the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and five senior officers were
44
killed. The government was ordered dissolved, all
gatherings were prohibited and the Constitution sus-

42
A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (New YorksHumanities Press, 1966)p.l04
43
ibid. p.35
44
Government Statement of the Current Nigerian
Situation (LagosiFederal Ministry of Information,I9 6 6 )
p.3 hereafter referred to as Government Statement
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pended by Major C. Nzeogwu, the prime architect of
the mutiny. However, these orders were ignored by
the Government in Lagos, and the Cabinet met on the
evening of the 15th» At this meeting, it was agreed
that the government would be handed over to the senior
member of the military. General A. Ironsi, the next
day. On the 17th, Major Nzeogwu,in Kaduna, surrendered
his dubious position, and declared loyalty to the
Federal Military Government, Thus the group which
attempted the coup had been unsuccessful because of
the "intervention of the bulk of the Nigerian Army",

45

However, the army still appeared as the most unified
group capable of carrying on the Nigerian State,
so it was to the upper levels of this group that
power was given.
In each case, the events of the coup reflect
the pattern of alienation to which the military had
been subjected. In Ghana, the security forces,with
the exception of those units directly under the pres
ident's control, had suffered misuse and abuse, both
actual, and in the light of the plans for Rhodesia,
potential.

Coupled with economic stagnation and the

deterioration of the political superstructure, this
produced a unified force which was able to act in

45
Government Statement p.3
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concert to remove the president and the party, and
assume the reins of government. In Nigeria, on the
other hand, only certain parts of the military had
been alienated. The dominance of family and regional
ties on the individual officer can be seen to have
resulted in a close correlation between the degree
of alienation of the individual officer and his eth
nic or regional status. This correlation may be less
ened by other influences such as service in colon
ial forces, age, or professionalism. In General Ironsi's
case, influences such as these may have reduced his
support for the officers engaged in the original
disturbances. Thus the officers from the eastern
region, or of eastern tribal background, would be
alienated by the attitudes of northerners towards
eastern people living in the north, and by attitudes
of northern leaders toward the eastern region. Under
these conditions, highly alienated eastern officers
would be the first to take action. The identification
of fourteen of the leaders of the January 15th mutiny
46
as "members of a certain ethnic group", identifiably

47
Ibo,

bears out this suggestion. The actions of this

group against mainly northern,or northern-supported,

46
Government Statement n .3*

47

Gutteridge, Militarv in African Politics,p .?5
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leaders reflects the direction of this alienation.
Officers of other ethnic or regional backgrounds, who
would not have been as alienated, supported their lead
ers, choosing to remain within the bounds of military
discipline.
The results of the coup differed only slightly
in the two countries.In Ghana, the immediate aim of
the COUP had been the elimination of Nkrumah and the
C.P.P.. Thus the police and the special branch of the
Criminal Investigation Division rounded up all those
v/ho had been connected with political leadership. These
included all members of the legislature, all senior
Flagstaff House officials, and all C.P.P. branch off48
icials.
This effectively removed all politicians from
consideration as members of the military government.
In Nigeria, although Parliament was suspended, few
politicians were arrested, although some were put into
protective custody, and then released within a few days,
It may have been regarded as unnecessary to arrest
the politicians, since except for Dr. Michael Okpara,
Premier of the eastern region, all well-known or high49
ly Influential politicians had been killed in the c o u n .

48
Africa Confidential #5&6, March 4 and March 18,1966
49
Also excepted were Chief 0 . Awolowo, Chief A,
Enharo and other prominent A.G. leaders in prison.
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In the Nigerian case, neither the events of the eon.p
nor the patterns of alienation led to the elimination
of the ability of politicians to participate in govern
ment, However, the leaders of the Ironsi,government did
not

accept politicians into the government, ordering

all politicians to their homes nending the investiga'
50'
tion of charges of corruption^
Although the events of the coups differed, the
subsequent military governments were very

similar. In

each case, the constitution of the country was suspend
ed, and all power was assumed by the military.The mil
itary excluded all politicians from government, handed
control of all levels of administration to the civil
servants, and delegated to senior bureaucrats the re
sponsibility of purging the ranks of the civil service,
and of maintaining standards of competence within gov51
ernmentr
The relations between the military and the
bureaucracy in the two countries were virtually iden
tical. In Nigeria, this pattern contributed to the
downfall of the Ironsi regime, while in Ghana, the
same pattern contributed to the success of the mili
tary government.

50
B .J , Dudley, Part'es and Po1i1101ans in Nortorn Nigeria.(bondonzPrank Cass and Co,,196dJppix-x,

.51
Daily TiT':es(T<rnT's) Jan.16,1966. Also Gutteridge,
Milnta/'y in Afrieay! Po!U.iirgrppl11,113
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In Ghana, the military and the bureaucracy
worked closely together to rebuild confidence in the
state. Following the coun, and the removal of parallel
structures of the C.P.P., the leading bureaucrats were
given ministerial powers by the National Liberation
Council(N.L.C.). With the expressed aim of eliminating
inefficiency and corruption, the N.L.C. and the bureau
cratic ministers initiated a reorganization of the
52
structures of government. Under this reorganization,
the number of ministries was reduced from 32 to 18,
and the number of administrative districts from 168
, 53
to 4 7 . Civil servants were appointed to regional and
district administrative committees to replace politi
cians, and city and local councils were replaced by
54
management committees composed of civil servants.
Additionally, the Civil Service Commission was reconsituted to ensure job security and equitable treatment
of civil servants, and to protect them from the vagaries
of any future leadership.
Following the change in regimes in Ghana, the

52
I. Markovitz, "Ghana Without Nkrumah", Africa
Report (April,1966)ppl0- 15

53
General A.A. Ankrah,"The Future of the Military
in Ghana" Africa Forum 2(2,1966)n.11.
54
Markovitz,"Ghana Without Nkrumah" p.13
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scope of the civil servants' duties was greatly expanded.
From purely administrative roles, senior bureaucrats
were brought into the inner circle of policy-making,
55
not only as advisors, but as final policy-makers.
Although this would not appear to be the case if only
the structure of the military government was assessed,
the nature of the military leadership, and the nature
of the concepts of government held by the military, set
the psychological boundaries of the bureaucratic role.
The original N.L.C. acted as a collegial head of govern
ment in Ghana. By this structure, the N.L.C. as a whole
was responsible for the government. The Cabinet Secretariat set up was along the lines of a staff planning
56
body that included expert advisors from the ministries.
Thus the military recognized the bureaucrats as inval
uable sources of advice and assistance. Since the mil
itary view of leadership was limited, they were more
willing than their political predecessors had been to
delegate responsibility.

Bureaucrats, as experts in

their fields, were delegated complete responsibility
for their decisions. Within the broad scope of effic
iency and rationality laid down by the N.L.C., and in

55

Africa Confidential #6 March 18,1966

56
M .Janewitz. The Militarv in the Political
Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1 9 6 2 ) p.8 ?
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fulfillment of the primary goals of economic recovery
and moderate socio-economic reform, the bureaucrats
both formulated and executed policy.
In the field of primary concern, economic re57
growth, the Economic Council, led by Mr. N. Omaboe,
the Government Statistician

whose repeated warnings

of impending economic disaster had been ignored by the
previous regime, acted as a composite economic policy
maker for Ghana. This can be seen in the statements
of March I9 6 6 , and in the subsequent budgets of the
N.L.C., in which the guidelines outlined for the re
construction of the economy stressed elimination of
those items which Mr. Omaboe had been most critical
during the Nkrumah regime: over-expenditure, prestige
58
projects, the development plan and the state enterprises.
As noted, these quasi-ministers were given com
plete internal control of their own departments, a
broadened scope which included both programme formu
lation and planning, as well as a co-ordinated imple
mentation. In the re-organization of the ministries and
the allocation of priorities, the civil service directed
59
its own affairs.
As previously noted, the Cabinet
57
The other members of the Council included Mr.
A. Adamokoh, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, and Mr. N,
S. Amagashie, Mr. Omaboe‘s deputy.
58
59

Africa Report(July I9 6 6 ) p . 36
Africa Report(November,I9 6 6 ) p.18
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Secretariat was re-organized to consist of senior bur
eaucrats chosen for their professional ability. In the
ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reduction of embassies
from 60 to 13 » and the removal of the politically or
iented civil servants was carried out completely by
the senior members of the ministry. Foreign relations,
the prime resposibility of General Ankrah as head of
the N.L.C., were developed and maintained entirely
by a committee composed of four prominent civil ser60
vants. The scope of this ministry v/as considerably
widened by the return of African Relations to the Min61
istry.
With the removal of political organizations,
the bureaucracy was also given the role of maintaining
contact between the people and the government. As men
tioned, local and municipal councils were reconstituted
to consist of civil servants. The replacement of pol
iticians by these civil servants at all levels meant
that the only line of communications or feedback from
the people to the military existed in the civil service.
This line was supplemented by the increasing criticism
of the newspapers and the intelligentsia, whose members

60
West Africa Annual I967 p.85
61
These had been handled during the Nkrumah
regime by a special office in Flagstaff House. Since this
was the prime concern of the Ministry, only European
and international organizations had been left to the
Ministry.
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had returned to Ghana following the coun to assist in
the work of reconstruction® This voice was mainly
negative, however, and the civil service tended to he
the voice of support for the military*
In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military
worked closely together* Possibly unconsciously, the
N.L.C. acted to relieve the alienation felt by the
bureaucracy during the previous regime. By broadening
the scope of responsibility, the N.L.C. removed the
prime reason for this alienation. Further, by its de
pendence on civil servants during this early period,
the military government was able to utilize the expert
ise of this group for the satisfaction of the prime
problems of the regime. These actions by the military
predisposed the bureaucracy to aid in the maintenance
62
of military rule.
In Nigeria, as in Ghana, the formation of the
military government in January,I966

resulted in the

close co-operation of the military leadership and the
bureaucracy. Following the removal of the politicians
from government, bureaucrats were given the same powers

given their Ghanaian counterparts. As in Ghana, the
Supreme Military Council acted as a collegial head of

62
F.G. Burke,"Public Administration in Africa",
Journal of Comparative Administration 1 (3>1969)pp352-354.
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government, and at the federal level,the senior bureau
crats were given the task of cleaning out political
appointées within a reduced structure in order to put
an end to "waste and extravagance in public expenditure'.'
Public corporations in Nigeria were siiniliar to those
in Ghana since they were a source of political patronage
to the parties. Furthermore, they were both expensive,
and for the most part, inefficient. Within two weeks
of the coun, these public corporations were reconstr
ucted to remove political appointées, who were replaced
64
by civil servants.
On February 1,1966, Mr. P.O. Nwokedi, formerly
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs,
was appointed Commissioner on Special Duties "to study
and report to the Supreme Military Council on the est
ablishment of an administrative machinery for a United
Nigeria, and on the unification of the public services
65
and judicial services of the Federation."
The appoint
ment of a civil servant to investigate such an area of
prime concern to the government shows the amount of
trust and co-operation expected of the bureaucrats.
In the regions, a similiar pattern of action

63
Daily Times(Lagos) January 29,1966
64
News From Nigeria February 19,1966 p.l?. Also
the Economist,February 11,1966
6<
j
News From Nigeria February 19>1966 p.l
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took place. Ih the western region, the executive council
consisted of the Governor, the senior military commander,
the police commissioner and six permanent secretaries
from the regional public service, although other permanent
secretaries could be co-opted.

A number of committees

and boards were purged of political appointees and restaffed
with primarily senior civil servants, although some academics

66
were included on specialized boards.

In the mid-west,

the executive council consisted of two military, one
police and five senior civil servants.

The number of

boards and commissions was reduced from seven to five,
and the number of ministries from twenty to eleven.
Civil servants, by decree, were given full powers of
control over the positions -. boards or ministries -,
6?
to which they were assigned.
In eastern Nigeria, the
changes were equally sweeping.

The number of ministries

was reduced from fifteen to twelve, the appointment

of

all board chairmen and members was revoked, and these
68
were replaced by senior employees of these boards.
In northern Nigeria, the pattern differed slightly, but
it was noticeable that almost all of the appointed civil

66
Daily Times (Lagos) February 17, 1966.
67
Daily Times (Lagos) February 2, I966 p. 1 6 .

68
Daily Times (Lagos) February 16, 1966 pp.2,8 ,9 .
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servants were northerners, while many 'clean* politicians
were also brought inAo government in a consultative
69
capacity.
One noticeable difference between the treatment
of civil servants in Ghana and Nigeria was the reliance
of the Ghanaian leaders on the civil service as a whole.
In Ghana, the civil service was given carte blanche to
rationalize its own structure and maintain the profess
ional standards expected of it.

Nigeria, on the other

hand, this reliance was not as evident.

In both

;the

east and mid-west states, the military governors publicly
70
denounced the lack of discipline in the public service.
In the mid-west the governor went even further, looking
tbe doors of all public offices at starting time, and
arresting all those late for v;ork.

This type of treat

ment was reflected in the criticism received by the civil
service in the press, which became so critical that
General Ironsi v/as forced to call on the press to stop
71
the
attacks.
In Ghana, the pattern of co-operation between
the military and the bureaucracy laid the groundwork for

69
Skurnik, W.
"Nigeria in Crisis"
History vol. 54 (230, 1 9 68 ) p. 146.

Current

70
Daily Times (Lagos)

January 19, I966 p.l.

71
News from Nigeria, Juno 1, I9 66,
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the alliance of these two groups and the solution of
Ghana's problems.

In Nigeria, however, this same pattern

contributed to the downfall of the Ironsi regime, on July
29th, 1 9 6 6 .

This can be attributed to two basic differences

between Ghana and Nigeria?

1)

the nature of support

for the military government, and 2 )

the nature of the

problems facing the military government.
In Ghana, the people were fairly unified in their
support of the miltiary government.

Further, the people
72
of Ghana were, for the most part, highly integrated.
The bureaucracy would have been representative of the
nature of the people, reflecting their unity.

In Nigeria,

on the other hand, support for the military government was
of a less unified nature.

Despite the one-Nigeria ethic

of the military leaders, the identification of leadership
was tribal rather than national, and the quality of support
73
varied within regions. Because of the predominance of
easterners in the top levels of the bureaucracy, this
structure would magnify, rather than minimize the split in
support along ethnic lines.

72
D. Austin,

"Saviour with a Sword;

II" Now

Society 'March 10, I966 p. 97 and K. Irvine, "Ghana
after Nkrumah" Current History 52 (30?» 1967) p. 150.
73
See Africa Renort and Africa Confidential
during the period January I966 to July 1966 regarding
variation in support.
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In Ghana, the nature of the bureaucratic-military
alliance matched the nature of the problems and the
methods of solving the problems facing the N.L.C. during
this period.

The problems, as previously noted, were

primarily economic, requiring direct government action
which, because of the goals involved, could be carried
out on an administrative basis.

Because there were no

manifestations of opposition, the military would regard
this alliance as successful.
In Nigeria, the initial problems of waste and
corruption were successfully attacked by the militarybureaucratic alliance.

However, in attacking the main

problem, the nature of the Nigerian state, this alliance
failed.

The measure of success in this area can only

be assessed on the basis of the amount of opposition
to the policies resulting from the alliance.

By its

very nature, the military-bureaucratic alliance worked
on the basis of consultation among members leading to the
policy decision, with the expectation of automatic siiMport
from those affected by the policy.

Decree 34 (1 9 6 6 )

of May 24, 1966 established a unitary state as a trans
ition to a new constitution.

An executive decree formed

by the consultation of the professional public servants,
this administrative instrument, and the nature of the
decision-makers, did not match the political nature of
the problem.

The close relations of eastern military
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and eastern bureaucrats

meant that this decree appeared

to other Nigerians as the extension of the rumoured
Iho domination. This resulted in attitudes of fear and
resentment In the minds of the other Nigerians, and

75
led to the riots of May and June,1966»

fu addition,

the failure of the military governs nt to revoke the
decree in the face of this opposition reflects the
nature of the alliance between the military and the
civil servants.In effect, the nature of the alliance
did not allow for the conciliation of the demands for
change. In this situation, there would appear no alter
native to the non-easterners except mutiny and countercoun.

Thus the nature of the alliance, the support

for the Ironsl government, and the problems faced
by the Ironsl government were contributory factors
to the northern-led counter-coun and the changes In the
pattern of relationships which subsequently developed.

74
While It Is recognized that the Supreme Council
of the Federal Military Government was formed on a
cross-tribal base, this rests on the assumption that
it would bo assumed by northerners that General Ironsl
would be more affected by the eastern officers. This would
be Identified with the rumoured Ibo domination.

75
Government Statement p.3. also Dally Times(laGos)
June 2 ,1 9 6 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV
CUREAUCRATIC-KIEITARY RELATIONS DURING
THE PERIOD OP MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
To this point, I have suggested the common
patterns in Ghana and Nigeria which set the stage for the
close working relationship between the bureaucrat and
military officer.

This chapter will discuss the differences

in the patterns of relationship which followed the initial
period of military rule, and will assess the qualitative
differences between the Ghanaian and Nigerian experience.
In Ghana, following the initial period of exper
imentation and dislocation, the military and the bureau
cracy worked closely together to solve the underlying
problems of the country.

Fortunately, these problems

had been relatively few.

The primary problems were those

of an economic nature, and posed the greatest challenge
to the N.L.C..

At the time of the coup, the economic

problems consisted of inflation,

unemployment, over

expenditure and mismanagement in the public sector, and
were of such magnitude that the Ghanaian economy was
on the verge of bankruptcy in the international economic
system.

These problems wore all closely inter-related,

and policy aimed at the solution to each part of the
over-all problem of economics had to be co-ordinated.
AA .
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One of the major problems, having both internal
and external consequences, was inflation, which had ueen
a problem in Ghana since I960.

The cost of living in

Accra, for example, had risen from an index of 100 in 19&0
to 136 in 1963, 153 in 19&^^ 196 in I963 &no ^0^ in
76
January 1966.
During the same period, the inflationary
pressures in the economy had reduced the purchasing
power of the oedi (^) so that local produce so^o in
Accra had almost
(119 - 226).

doubled in price between 19&^ and 1966

Compounding this, wages had stayed constant

in the public sector, with the last pay raise in that
sector occurring in i960.
The second aspect of the economic difficulties
facing the N.l.C, was unemployment and underemployment.
Although unemployment figures for Ghana are highly
questionable prior to 1966, the N.L.C. estimated that
at the time of the coup, 12# of the labour force was
unemployed.

This situation would intensify

solved fairly rapidly.

if not

The rate of movement from rural

to urban centres was fairly high, and the numbers entering
the work force from school were greater than the increase
ill jobs in the stagnant economy «

Thi c. created a social

problem, and a potential political problem, since it was
76
This section abstracted from the Quarterly
Review of Ghana, Sierra bonne, Ggmhia and T,Tbvrf[a.
TEconomist Intelligence Service)196? - 1968 andAfrica
Renort vol. 8 , I966.
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the unemployed and poorly educated from which Mkrumah
77
had dr&wn the hulk of the C.P.P. support.
A supplementary problem was that of under-employ,
ment, uneconomical employment, or disguised unemployment,
The number included under this heading varies, but did
include most employees of state enterprises, the members
of the worker's brigade, and those for whom positions
had been made in the public service.
The third and fourth aspects of the economic
problems facing the N.L.C. are closely connected.
the time of the coun.
860,1 million cedis.

Ghana's national debt had reached
Of this 395*3 million 0 or

million, was in external debt.
amounted to

At

^ 280

The long torn debt

E 123 million, while the medium term debt

amounted to 2 155 million, the bulk of which was due
78
by 1971* The cause of this debt had been massive
deficits in the budgets of the last five years.

With

the numerous prestige projects, and the high import
rate, this external debt had risen from 38,4 million
0 in 1963*

In the same period, as can be seen in the

table below, the high levels of deficits in the budgets,
added still :!:ore to the problem.

77
Bretton, Rise and Pall, pp. 43, 44,
7Î
Ghana Today vol. 11 y4 April 19* 1967, p. 5«
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TABLE II

79
REVENUE, EXPENDITURE AND DEBT
In riilllon Cedi

Revenue
Expenditure
Deficit
External Debt
Total Debt

1963

1964

1965

1 6 5 .0
2 6 5 .4
10Ô.4
3 8 .4
3 1 3 .3

2 9 3 .4
3 7 7 .4
84.0
246.8
6 7 0 .7

284. Ô
3 6 1 .6
7 7 .6
3 7 8 .4
7 8 5 .5

The N.L.C. was also confronted by the fact that
choices of policy instruments to combat the economic
problems were severely restricted. To reduce the deficit
would require either raising revenues, or lowering
expenditures, or a mixture of the two. Increasing rev
enues would necessitate either higher taxes or higher
revenues from the foreign sector. However, in 19&5 Ghana
enjoyed the highest tax rate in West Africa, so that
raising taxes was effectively removed as a policy weapon,
Higher revenues, on the other hand, were dependent on
factors outside the control of the N.L.C.. Ghana, an
agricultural exporter, was a price taker, unable to
set its own price for exports. Thus the revenues from
this export market were uncertain.

There was a third

option, however. This was the external financing of
the debt, but this also was, at the time of the coup

79
Quarterly Review,passim
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barred from the policy arsenal. The size of the external
debt left by Nkrumah, and the depressed state of the
economy, had resulted in an international lack of con
fidence in Ghana's ability to pay its debts. However,
since this last measure was the only one both certain
and acceptable,.the primary concern of the N.L;C. became
the rebuilding of international confidence through the
efficient management of the domestic economy.
The second general problem faced.by the N.L.C.
was that of political reconstruction and purification.
The coup had been aimed at the corrupt personal party
machine of Nkrumah, the C.P.P.. Thus the second aim of
the military government was to restructure the political
environment of Ghana to preclude the possibility of
such a machine once again taking control of the country.
To accomplish this, the N.L.C. viewed the major goals
as the construction of a constitution which would balance
the powers of the three sectors of government, and the
removal from the political arena of the influence of
80
the C.P.P.. Therefore, the aims were the moderate econ
omic reform , and the building of the infra-structure
81
of a democracy which had been lost.

80
R.L. Harris," Effects of Political Change on the
Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria"
Administrative Science Quarterly 13(3»1968)p.398•
81
Ghana Today March 23,1966,p.4,
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The prospect of the attainment of these aims
meant the return to civilian rule. The N.L.C. had committed itself to this return both at the time of the
coup, and at various times during the period of cons
olidation of rule. In effect, the N.L.C. had three
goals: rehabilitation of the economyipurification of
the political system; and, return of power to civilian
hands. To assess the bureaucratic-military relations
in Ghana, it is necessary to investigate not only the
degree of success of the N.L.C. in meeting their goals,
but more importantly, how and why the N.L.C. was able
to maintain the alliance with the bureaucracy.
The solution to the first set of problems, the
economic, was undertaken under the direction of the
Economic Committee of the N.L.C.. As outlined by General
82
Ankrah, the reconstruction of Ghana's economy would ■
take place in three steps:
1)'emergency'action to avoid international
bankruptcy and re-establish Ghana's credit;
2 )'consolidation'to rid the economy of its in
ternal problems; and
3 ) 'preparation for development', laying the
firm groundwork for expansion and growth.
The emergency period would cover the period between the

82
Speech on Ghana Radio, March 15,1966, as reported
in Daily Times(lagos) March 17,1966.
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COUD and the introduction of the N.L.C.'s first budget
(July 1 ,1 9 6 6 ).

During this period, the economic committee

and the N.L.C. were to take measures to drastically reduce
imports and other drains on foreign reserves.

The

consolidation period was to include the first full year
of military rule.

In fact, this period lasted until

August 1967 * &nd was to include a

reorganization of

the public sector to place this sector on a firm basis.
The private sector was to be induced to expand and
diversify, laying a ground work for the lessening of
Ghana's dependence on one crop.

The third period had

no time limit, and included the organization and co
ordination of al] economic enterprises.

The successful

initiation of this step was to be the determinant of the
83

return to civilian rule.
Both internal and international measures had
to be taken in order to re-establish international
confidence in the Ghanaian economy.

The primary step

required was the drastic reduction and eventual elimination
of the deficit in the budget.

The N.L.C., because of the
84
economic conditions previously noted,
had no choice

but to restrict government expenditures to the minimum

83

Condensed from the I967 ^hite rarer on Economic
Affairs reprinted in Ghana Today August 11, I9 6 7 ,
84

Supra,
p.
...
A*
. 42'
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possible.

This policy was initiated during the 'emergency*

period, and continued throughout the rule of the N.L.C..
As shown in Table III, the expenditures in I966 were sharply
reduced from the I965 level (Table II), and the rate of
85
increase of expenditures was also reduced.
TABLE III
o

REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN MILLIONS OP CEDIS,
Year

Revenue
Expenditures
Balance

I9 6 6 /6 7

230,9
268.4
-37*5

1 9 6 7 /6 8

I9 6 8 /6 9

241.5
3 0 1 .I
-5 9 .6

34o,4
3 0 3 .8
+3 6 ,8

eluded the re-organization of the government.

19^9/70 0:

375.7
302.7
+73'0

Ac noted

in the previous chapter, the number of ministries was
reduced from 32 to 18, and the size of these remaining
ministries reduced.

As shewn in Table IV, every area of

government was affected in both current and Capital
expenditures.

G5

Unfortunately, these figures may be somewhat
misleading on the reduction in the rate of increase
due to devaluation of the cedi and the introduction
of the Now Cedi.

86
Statistics abstracted fro:,i Or u'terlv Rcvi.ev;
for 1966 - 1 9 7 0 .
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TABLE IV

87
.1931
Cur- Cap
rent ital
Mn.^
5*0
2 4 .6

Ï9&&
Cur- Cap
rent ital
Mn.NC Mn.MC
2274
3.1

1967
Cur Cap
rent ital
Mn.NC Mn.NC
4.5
29.3

3^rvioe
Defence
Administration,Jus
52.4 19.9 38.0
2 .6 42.9
tice and Police
5.5
Education
4 .2 62.7
5.8
67.9 11.3 55.1
Health
21.7
0.7 15.9
1.9 13.9
0.7
9.0 21 .2
Other Social Services 3 0 .4 27.4 23.0
15.5
Agriculture and nonmlneral resources
6.4
24.5 22.5 19.8
7.4 19.8
6*4 19.0
0 .0
0 .0
Fuel and Power
2.3
1.9
Manufacturing and
Construction
6.7 20.3
4.5 31.5
3.7 20.7
Transportation, Storage
8.4 1 8 .4
5.6
5.4
6.5
and Communications
7.7
4 .2
2 2 .7 .8 ._9_ 2 1 .2 . 9 ,2 ._2j W
Other
Total
263^% 170.2 20:1^6 164.8 230 ..9_ 70.2
These reductions in expenditure resulted from the clos
ing down of state enterprises of a non-viable nature,
88
the slowing down of other projects, and the re-organ
ization of inefficient state enterprises.
In order to reduce the drain on the reserves
of foreign currency, import licences were restricted
to only those having clear need, such as manufacturers
needing raw materials or enterprises needing new equip
ment. Furthermore, tight controls were placed on dom
estic credit in an attempt to reduce purchases of im-

87
Statistics abstracted from Quarterly Review,1966-68

88
These latter projects included the harbour at
Teraa, the Volta River Power Project and a number of roads.
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ported non-essentials» These measures resulted in a
significant reduction in the deficit of trade in I966
and 1967, and a surplus on the export-import balance
89
in 1968c It should be noted that these measures were
combined with changes in both type and value of the
currency, with the cedi(^) being replaced by the New
Cedi(NO) in February, I967# In July,1967* the New Cedi
was devalued in an attempt to encourage exports and
reduce imports*
The major problem in the foreign sector, however,
was the outstanding debt. As noted in Table II above,
the total external debt had reached 378.4 million Cedi,
or £ 280 million. Of prime concern was the medium term
debt, amounting to £155 million, which was due within
five years. Because of the measures outlined above, and
the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, the
N.L.C. was able to cover most current and arrears pay
ments on short term debt. This helped re-establish
international confidence in Ghana, enabling the N.L.C.
and the countries to whom the medium term debt was
owed to arrange an agreement satisfactory to both parties.
Under this agreement, a two-year moratorium was granted,
allowing the N.L.C. to use the funds which otherwise

G9

Export-Import balances in million ^ or NO,
1963 :- 43.2
1966: - 59.2
1964 :-1 3 .3
1967 *-1 9 .9
1965 :-9 3 '2
19681+29.1
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G .aid have been used for debt payment in the rebnild/ing of the economy and the clearance of outstanding
-nort-term debts. Also, the medium-term debts were
'rescheduled, extending the time required to repay the
'.debts.
The reduction in government expenditures, while
primarily aimed at reducing the budgetary deficit, had
rooth beneficial and detrimental side-effects. The
second facet of the economic problem facing the N.L.C.
had been massive inflation.

ITie dominant causes of this

inflation had been the method of financing the budgetary
deficit and the expenditures on prestige projects.
As is noted in Table 11, the internal debt had risen
'faster than the external debt. With the decline in
international confidence, the Nkrumah government had
been forced to finance this deficit internally. Loan
able funds had been scarce, and the independant business
man who was able to borrow was forced to raise prices
in order to cover the cost of the borrowing. In addition
to this reason, the direction of government expendi
tures contributed to the inflationary spiral. As is
apparent in Table IV, capital expenditures were high.
These capital expenditures had been for non-economic
prestige projects, such as Job 400( the O.A.U. Council
Hall in Accra), the Ghanaian airline, and the shipline.
These expenditures poured money into the Ghanaian economy
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forcing prices higher. As these expenditures were re
duced, the pressure on prices was .reduced, and the
price level started to fall. By I967, this price level
had fallen to I90 from 205 in I966.
These reductions had detrimental effects. The
other facet of the economic problem had been the high
unemployment rate. In I966, the N.L.C. estimated that
90
there were over 100,000 seeking employment. These
figures did not include those in the Worker's Brigade,
or those underemployed in state enterprises. As the
prestige projects were stopped or completed, the
workers on the projects were added to the ranks of the
unemployed. As operating costs were reduced on other
enterprises, more people who had received their jobs
as patronage, and who were surplus or redundant, were
also fired, adding still further to the problem.
A second detrimental effect of austerity was
the loss of business confidence. As import licences
were restricted, a number of firms closed down because
91
of the shortage on imported goods. Further, other '
businesses closed down because of the lack of either
patronage or legitimate government contracts. These

90
Ghana Today April 19,196? p.5»
91

As noted in West Africa and the Economist
during this period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56

business closings meant a reduction in work opportunity,
further adding to the unemployment' problem. Neither the
effects nor the problem were attacked directly, but it
was hoped that the general improvement of the economy
would solve them. By I968, the

reopening of rmmy state

enterprises as co-operative government-private enter
prise firms absorbed some of the unemployed, and in
duced other private firms to open or expand.
In the solution of the second set of problems,
the political, the N.L.C. originally set its goals as
theelimination of the C.P.P. and the return to civil92
ian rule by 1968. The first policy was to bar the
W
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subsequent civilian government in Ghana; the second
aimed at ensuring that the people of Ghana could not
be subjected to the control of a single party again.
To attain these goals, the N.L.C. used the organization
of government to direct the political future of Ghana.
The collapse of the personal party machinery of
the C.P.P. did not mean the removal of the C.P.P. from
Ghana. Since C.P.P. membership had been fairly wide
spread, a purge of all members of the proscribed party
would have been neither moral nor equitable, since some
people, in order to gain promotion or a position, or
to operate a business profitably, had been forced to
92
Radio Ghana Broadcast by General Ankrah

March 3,

1966
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become members of the party.

Investigations were held

to verify the individual members' political purity,
but the main drive was against those who had held an
office in the party.
Those members of the C.P.P. who had engaged in
corrupt practices were regarded in two categories. The
first, those who had received gifts from the President
or some other highly placed official, were ordered to
return the gifts to the state. These included such things
as automobiles, houses and land. The second category
included the gift givers. These were, if still in Ghana,
arrested and tried for corruption. As well, all those
who had held a seat in the National Assembly as a C.P.P.
member or had supported the C.P.P. in the Assembly were
barred from holding political office in Ghana for a
■period of ten years dating from the return to civilian
94
rule.
These included even those C.P.P. politicians
who had disagreed with Nkrumah and left Ghana before
1966, such as K.A. Gbederaah. By this ban, the N.L.C.
ensured that there would be no resurgence of the C.P.P.
in Ghana.

93

See Bretton, The Rise and Fall noteably those
chapters on the C.P.P.
94
These included all members of parliament, party
district leaders, region leaders, or members of the C.P.P.
governing bodies, also teachers at the ideological institute.
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Although the original commitment to return to
civilian rule had been taken by many to be the standard
95
speech of military rulers,
the transfer to civilian
rule on September 1,1969 meant the fulfillment of tlie

commitment made by General Kotoka the day of the coun.
The return to civilian rule followed a period of re
vitalization of politics in Ghana,
With the end of the emergency period of econ
omic stabilization, the formation of a constitutional
commission, headed by Chief Justice Akofo-Addo, was
announced on September 1 ,1966, and held its first meeton November 4,1966. While,this may have appeared
as if it were only to placate critics, the commission
held public hearings throughout Ghana, and worked closely
96
with the political committee of the N.L.C., After
fifteen months of work, the commission submitted a draft
constitution to the N.L.C. on January 26,1968, which
was published January 29,1968. At the same time the
constitution was published, a 140 man constitutional
assembly was authorized. Its purpose was to study the
draft, and to submit a final draft for electoral approval.

95
Such as in D. Austin,"Saviour with a Sword"
New Society March 10,1966 p.22
96
The political committee consisted of former
members of opposition parties, chaired by Dr. K.A. busia.
This committee was appointed July 1,1966 to assist the
N.L.C. on political matters. However, it was powerless.
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Since this assembly was to be elected, an electoral
commissioner was appointed. Following the appointment,
a firm schedule for return to civilian rule was ann
ounced over Radio Ghana May 22,1968, By this schedule,
the electoral commissioner was to conduct the regis
tration of voters beginning September 1,1968; elections
to the constituent assembly on a non-partisan basis
were to be held in May,1969, the ban on politics lifted
in June,1969 and the new constitution to by completed
by August 1 ,1969,with elections for the civilian gov
ernment

to be completed no later than September 30,1969,

The elections were held August 29,1969, and the military
stepped down on September 1, I969,
While these events were taking place, other hints
of the strength of the commitment to return to civil
rule were evident. On June 30,196?, the structure of the
N.L.C. was changed to include a national executive
council (N.E.C.) and a national advisory council(N.A.C.),
The N.E.C. consisted of the top three men in the N.L.C.
and thirteen civilian(bureaucrats) commissioners with
ministerial responsibility, charged with the direction
and control of government, a field previously held by
the N.L.C. alone. The N.A.C. consisted of this group
plus fifteen appointees chosen to represent the various
groups in the society, including chiefs and women.
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On October 23, 196?* following a series of
strikes. General Afrifa stated over Radio Ghana that
the N.L.C. would continue to rule only if it received
97
a mandate at the polls. During July, August and Sept
ember, a public opinion poll, said to be the first held
98
in a country under military rule, was conducted by
an independent polling agency. Its findings were pub
lished on December 2,196?, expressing the general opin
ion that the N.L.C, should return power to civilians
by 19?0. On December 9*Generals Ankrah and Afrifa publically supported this opinion, and restated the
99
commitment of the N.L.C..
The N.L.C. was able to meet its goals and com
mitments.

[Mrs return to civilian rule meant that the

N.L.C. considered that the political structure envis
ioned in the new constitution was viable, and the econ
omy was well on its way to steady growth.
The final area to be investigated is the reasons
why the N.L.C.was able to meet their commitments. As
100
noted by Feit, Gutteridge and others,
the military in

97
Africa Rcoort January, 1968 p.42
98
Africa Report March I968 p.33
99
Africa Report March I968 p.33

100
E. Feit,"Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria"
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Ghana was able to gain the support of groups such as
the bureaucracy, the middle class and the intelligentsia,
groups which had been excluded from positions of power
in the Nkrumah regime. Furthermore, the N.L.C. was able
to retain this support by acting in co-operation with
these groups, especially the bureaucracy. Second, the
N.L.C. took over a citizenry which had been highly
politicized, and which was highly unified, exhibiting
few divisive characteristics such as inter-tribla con101
flict or regional identification.
Third, there were
few requirements for actions of a highly political
nature, that is, that required compromise. The primary
problems which the N.L.C. had to face had been economic;
this meant that economic or administrative methods
could be used to solve the problems,and political sideeffects could be ignored. The second problem, the C.P.P.,
was also handled on an administrative basis, with the
judiciary being the means of ensuring support for the
actions taken. All other matters were handled on an
administrative basis, with the priorities of the goals
being the determinant of the methods. Finally, the
N.L.C. was able to utilize the common distrust of pol-

100(cont.)
World Politics XX(1,196?) pp.181 and 192. W.F.
Gutteridge, Military in African Politics(London:Methuen,
19&9)pp.119-125.

101
Austin, "Saviour with a Sword"p.22
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iticians to maintain its rule until such time as the
mechanism for the return to civilian rule had been
developed»

In Ghana, the bureaucratic-military alliance

was maintained by the two way support of the military
utilizing the expertise of the bureaucracy, and the
bureaucracy proving its worthiness to the military by
the successful handling of the problems facing the
government.
In sum, it appears that the N.L.C. was able
to attain the goals it had set for itself because of the
nature of the goals, and the means used to attain them.
Each of the goals was basically operational, and in the
Ghanaian context, non-controversial. The methods empl
oyed were basically administrative, and allowed the
bureaucracy to be fully employed in all facets of
problem-solving. It was not necessary for the N.L.C.
either to use existing political groups or to establish
new political groups to extend and maintain its regime,
since the civil service was able to perform this function.
Finally, it may be that the military rulers, since they
were planning on a return to civilian rule, may have
wished to keep the politicians who would take over free
from the stigma caused by the unpopularity of the aus
terity moves, keeping them in the background.
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In Nigeria, the patterns which were slmillar to
the Ghanaian experience during the first six months
of military rule did not lead to similiar patterns of
relations in the maintenance of the military regime.
The assessment of the Nigorian situation

can he accom

plished by comparing Nigeria's basic problems, commit
ments and support patterns to the Ghanaian experience.
In this way, the reasons for the changes in the patterns
of military government can be examined in the context
of the commitments made.
The basic Nigerian problem, unlike Ghana's,
stemmed from the basic structure of the state. This
102
structure had allowed little room for maneuvering at
the federal level due to the predominance of power in
the regions, and the disparities involved. This meant
that the northern region would be in a dominant pos
ition in the federal government, being the largest re
gion. Contributing to this dominance was the copulation
103
factor.
The population of the northern region was
nearly equal,or more than, the population of the rest
of Nigeria. This meant that the dominant party in the
102
By maneuvering is meant the possibility of
shifting alliances between groups to gain control of the
government.
103
On regionalism, see O.Awolowo,Lb--^hts on the
Nigerian Constitution(London*Oxford UnicefJiCv Press,1966)
PP.23-2Ü. Also H. Carol"The Making of Nigerians Political
Regions" Journal of Asian and African Studies 2(4,1967)
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north would be the dominant party In the Federation,
The second contributor factor was the problem of oth104
nicity or tribalism.
Because of this factor, the
lack of maneuvering room received much more sinister
overtones, with the northern dominance being regarded
as a Hausa-Fulani dominance, and giving any move to
reduce this dominance implications of an inter-tribal
conflict. The third contributory factor was the lack
105
of a national identity,
which removed the framework
within which these other problems could be worked out.
This lack of national identity meant that anyone who
attacked the state because of its

shortcomings

be in turn attacked on the basis of
background, not

would

his regionnl

his motives.

As can be seen, each of these problems was
closely related to the others, and each was more com
plex in nature than Ghana's had been. This is not to
say that Nigeria did not have any other problems. Like
Ghana, corruption and the waste of funds for prestige
104
On tribalism, see R.L. Sklar,"Nigerian Politics
in Perspective" Government and Onnosition 2(4,196?) pp.
524— 5 3 9 ® Also C « l7 c ;;< u ra ''N e v / I l o p e

(2 3 0 ,1 9 6 8 ) ppl2?-136

i ’o x '

Nigeria" R o cl Tab 1 o

'

"'

105
See Carol"Political Regions" and D.J. Murray,
"Nigeria After Biafra" Current History 58(343,19?0)nnl35-l4l,
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projects were also problems in Nigeria. Unlike Ghana,
the overall economic situation was bright, although
regional disparities did exist. These economic
problems, however, were minor compared to the more
basic problems of restructuring Nigeria on a more viable
basis.
Prom the discussion of the complexities involved,
the reasons for the failure of General Ironsi *s Decree
3 4 (1 9 6 6 ) can be appreciated. As previously mentioned,
this decree unified the structure of Nigeria. This
unitary concept had been central to the Ironsi regime's
concept of Nigeria. However, the attempt to implement
this by an executive instrument formulated in confer
ence with senior bureaucrats and military leaders led
to political unrest and, threats of secession in the
horth and west. In effect, the attempt to build a new
structure without first changing the political base
of the country, and solving some of the above mentioned
problems, allowed politicians in the north to play on
the fears and tribal distrust of the people, leading
106
to riots, massacres and the second coun.
The same problems existed for the Gov/on govern-

106
W.A.E.Skurnik"Nigeria in Crisis" Current His
tory 5 2 (3 09,1 9 6 7 ) ppl42-l48. Also B.J. Dudley Parties and
Politicians in Northern Nigeria(London:F . Cass&Go.,I968T"
pp.x-xi.
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ment, with the problems of regionalism, tribalism and
the lack of a national identity magnified by the events
of the Ironsi regime. However, these problems were
approached in quite a different fashion from that which
General Ironsi had favoured. To solve the overall pro
blem of maintaining the viability of the Nigerian state,
the first problem to be approached was that of the
structure of the post-military government. To this end.
Chiefs Awolowo and Enaharo, and fifteen other prominent
political figures were released from detention on August
2 ,1 9 6 6 aad August 4,1966.

, Many of these were taken

into the government's advisory councils. On September
1 2 ,1966, these political figures, and others from the
regions, joined in a conference on the country's future
constitution. The purpose of this conference,which met
in Lagos, was the fashioning of a political structure
for Nigeria which would take into account the factors
mentioned above, and could be of any form, except the
unitary. Also excluded were the options of continuing
the military government, and the complete break-up of
107
the country.
In October, I9 6 6 , this conference produced an interim report which favoured a federal syctcm,
but made no recommendations as to either the number of
states or the division of powers in the federation.
107
New.York Times 13 September,I966
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These were left to negotiation between the regions and
the military government. While this conference was in
session, however, relations between the central govern
ment and the government of eastern region had deter
iorated. The governor of the region refused to allow
the delegates from the region to return to Lagos after
the recess ended in October. Because of this boycott,
the conference was adjourned indefinitely on November
108
1 6 ,1966.
On November 20, I9 6 6 , General Gowon stated
that Nigeria would remain a federation of between eight
and fourteen states. Relations between the east and
the central government continued to deteriorate, with
many statements that the central government w a s .again
trying to force a new form for Nigeria on the regions.
The estrangement continued, culminating on May 3 0 ,1 967,
with the secession of the eastern region. On the same
day. General Gowon issued the twelve state decree,
which may have been either causal or resultant of the
secession. This is based on the supposition that there
would have been consultation between Gowon and the
regional governors on the content of the decree.
In form, the twelve state decree,like Général

108
On Record,"NigeriasTribalism against Unity".p.75
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Ironsi’s Decree 34(1966), was an executive instrument#
However, in content and method of formulation, these
decrees varied greatly. The decision to create the
twelve state system was made after public consultation
with representatives of the four main regions of Nigeria.
These representatives were mainly *clean'politicians who
were respected by the members of the region they repres
ented. Furthermore, the system took into account the
realities of the Nigerian political system, and attempted
to correct the structural defects of the old constitu
tion. By this decree, the minority tribes in the
various regions were implicitly given their ovm states.
In the eastern region, the minority tribes in the Calabar,
Ogaja and Port Hareourt

provinces were given their own

states of Rivers and South-Eastern, removing the minor
tribes from the domination of the Ibo, a move requested
109
prior to 1958*
The Yoruba in the north were given the
West-Central state, while other minor tribes were given
the Bene Plateau and Kano states. The moslera tribes were
thus split among the North-Western, North-Central and
110
North-Eastern states.
109
Cf. Carol,"Nigeria Political Regions" p.278
concerning the C.O.R, proposal to the Minorities Comm
ission of 1958e
110
Cf. Awolowo, Thoughts *Map* Nigeria : Proposed
States'*.
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With the break-up of the north and east, the
problem of tribal domination of the Federation was re
duced. The strength of the tribally-based parties rested
on the control that they had over large areas of the Fed
eration. With the reduction of the area of the states,
this power base was reduced. It also resulted in the pro
bability that the previous opposition parties such as the
N.E.P.U. and the United Middle Belt Congress would con
trol some of the new states in the north, and small par
ties in the east would, control the new eastern states.
With this structure, it appears that the problem of flex
ibility or maneuvering at the federal level was reduced.
In addition, the problem of the lack of national iden
tity may have been reduced as well. While identity had
previously been regional because of the power of the
regions, the new structure may lead to a centralization
of power in the federal government, and a change in iden111
tity from regional to national.
The primary focus here, however, is the nature of
the decision-maker and his advisors. As noted above, the
'clean* politicians played a large role in the formation
of the new structure for Nigeria.

The influence of Chief

Awolowo is especially significant, if his proposals and
112
the new structure's actual boundaries are considered.
111
C . begum"New Hope for Nigeria" p.132
112
Awolowo,Thoughts
October, 196?, pp53-5.5«

as compared to Africa Report
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It can bo assumed that, in this case at least, the in
fluence of the bureaucrat was less that that of the
politician .
By the end of I968, nine of the new state gov
ernments were functioning. This expansion created prob
lems for the military government, since the expansion
from old to new states necessitated the transfer of
bureaucrats at a time when competent senior bureaucrats
were in short supply. This shortage was due to the ex
odus of senior Ibo bureaucrats during the early months
of 1967, with the majority of these senior bureaucrats
113
returning to the eastern region.
These bureaucrats'
positions had not been filled, due to the policy of
holding positions open for them. With this shortage,
and the demand for civil servants, the drive against
corruption had to be halted. The problem of inefficient
state enterprises had been removed by General Ironsi's
policy of replacing the commissioners with civil servants,
as noted in Chapter two.
In Nigeria, the commitment was also made to
return the country to civilian rule as soon as the
problems had been solved.

Thin commitment v^aa made both

114
by General Ironsi and General Gowon.

The attaining of

113
Murray,"Nigeria After Biafra" p.139*
114
Economist January 2 9 ,1 9 6 6 and Nigerian Weekly New;
Review August 12,l9oo,
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success of this commitment

depended upon both the success

of the military government in attaining its goals, and
the strength of the desire to return rule to the civ
ilians, Both of these factors can be assessed on the
basis of the military government's inclusion of civil
ians in the military government,As mentioned above,
politicians were brought into the central government at
an advisory level on the nature of the constitution.
Since this was the basic problem concerning the military
government, it can be assumed that this meant that the
military planned for more major roles for the politicians.
This is sunported by the inclusion of civilians in the
115
government at the policy level during the civil war.
As well, the twelve state structure appeared to solve
the basic problems of Nigeria, and the cessation of the
civil war in January,1970, completed the drive to maintain
the integrity of Nigeria. It can be projected that once
the problems of rehabilitating the war zone are solved,
the oft stated commitment to return to civilian rule
will be carried out.
In both Ghana and Nigeria, the initial pattern
of bureaucratic-military relations was one of close co-

115
For example, the War Cabinet of August 26,19&7
included four civilians* Awolowo, Enaharo, Elias and
Arikpo, Keesinvs Contemporary Archiver 19&7 p.21994a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
oration between the bureaucracy and the military at
-'\1 times during the initial period of consolidation.
D"'urlng the subsequent period, however, the patterns
varied. In Ghana, the pattern remained one of close
bureaucratic-ml11tary co-operation. The N.L.C. and the
bureaucracy held dominant positions in the councils of
government, including the economic and executive councils.
116
'those of primary concern.
In Nigeria, on the other hand,
the subsequent-period showed few civil servants

in

prominent positions. In the Federal Executive Council,
of the fifteen members, only three belonged to the
security forces. The remainder of the Council was com
posed of two chiefg(both Action Group loaders), and
ten other civilians. Of these ten, only one can tenta
tively be classed a bureaucrat. Dr. J.E. Adetoro, Comm
issioner for Health,

Of the remainder, Dr. T.O. Elias

had been/Ütourney-General for the Federation for many
years, and was considered a clean politician. Dr. 0.
117
Arikpo was a well known figure in Nigeria. Of the

116
The political committee was disbanded on June
30,1967 in favour of an independent body formed to
educate the people in democracy.
117
West Africa Annual 1968 and Africa Report 196?
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118
remainder, two are definitely ex-politicians,

while

the other five are well-known figures, probably "clean*
119
ex-politicians from minority parties of other regions.
Each of the commissioners was in full charge of the
ministry or ministries to which they were appointed,
with the permanent secretary of the ministry subject
to the political commissioner.
In the regions, the same held true* Prior to
J u l y , 1968, the regional councils of government contained

mainly politicians* In keeping with the pattern of the
central government, these were mainly members

of the

minor or opposition parties responsible for the ministries.
In addition, the political advisor of the governor of
the region

was the man who had been political governor

of the region prior to the coup. The position of the
politicians in the regional government was probably
exemplified in the extreme in the western region,
where the politicians were dominant.

In this region,

the decrees of the military governor had to be supported
by the political commissioners, and Chief Av/olowo, to
be obeyed. Most of this

influence was wielded by the

Action Group loader in the region,

Adegbenro,

and his

118
A.A. Kano(N.E.P.U.) and J.S. Tarka(U.M.B.C.)
119
This assumption is based on the familiar way
in which they are referred to in Nigerian sources, imply
ing that they were well-known in the south.
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deputies, Onabanjo and Ige. Other politicians in the
government included the leader of the N.C.N.C. in the
120
west and his deputy leader, and one Independent.
In the
north, civilian commissioners consisted of both "clean"
politicians and the more reputable and liberal emirs
and chiefs.
After the new state governments became funct^n
ioning governments, it can only bo assumed that the
same situation would occur. With the expansion from
121
three to eleven governments,
the problems of setting
up the new administrations virtually preclude civil
servants from being used to politically control the
new states. The civil servants would be faced with the
problems of transferring power from the old governments
and would be needed to direct the activities of their
new departments. Since this would be an area of prime
concern to the military rulers, it can be assumed that
the demand would be for politicians to act as organizers
of support rather than civil servants.
In summation, it appears that the pattern of
military-bureaucratic relations in Nigeria did vary greatly

120
Africa Confidential Mayl2,1966
121
Not included are the old eastern regional gov
ernment or the new east-central state governmnet, since this
state was, until Jan,13,1970, the "Biafran'stronghold.
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from the Ghanaian pattern. The problems of Nigeria
seem to have resulted in reputable politicians being
brought into alliance with the military rulers for the
purpose of solving the basically political problems of
Nigeria. It appears, therefore, that in the development
of this varied pattern of relationships in Nigeria,
the problems which faced the military governments
during the period following the coup of July,l966,
influenced the attitudes of the military, which led to
the inclusion of the politicians in policy-making
positions, and the relegating of bureaucrats to lesser
roles.
T A M
V
Regional, Ethnic or Political Identification
of Nigerians Noted in this Paper____________
Name
Position
Region
___________________ _____________________ Party
Tribe
Akintoia,S .A ,
Premier
,We st N.N.D ,P . Yoruba
Awolowo,0.
Leader A.G,
West A.G,
Yoruba
Balewa,SirA,T.
Prime Minister,Federal. North N.P.C.
H.Ft
Bello,Sir A.
Premier
North N.P.C.
H.F*
Enharo ,A.
Deputy Leader,A.G.
Mid-West A.G. Yoruba
Gowon, General Y. Head of Federal Military
Government July,1966North
Middle Belt
Christian
Ironsi,General A. Head of Federal Military
Government Jan.1966-July,1966 East
Ibo
* H.F.- Hausa-Fulani group.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Since Ghana and Nigeria have in common a simi
lar experience with British colonialism, and the bur
eaucracy and the military in the two countries were
subjected to

similar

standards of professionalism, it

could be expected that the two countries would experience
similiar pattern of relationships in military govern
ments. Nevertheless, after the civilian regimes were
overthrown in the two countries in I966, significantly
different patterns of relationships among the political,
bureaucratic and military leadership groups developed
during the subsequent periods of military government.
In each case, the coup resulted in the removal of civil
ian politicians from power, and the creation of an al
liance between the military and the bureaucracy. In
Ghana, this bureaucratic-military alliance was maintained
during the entire period of military government. In
Nigeria, on the other hand, this alliance contributed to
the downfall of the Ironsi regime, and to the establish
ment of the subsequent alliance of the military and
76
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political leadership groups^
The crucial difference between the militarybureaucratic patterns in the two countries appears
to bo based on the attitudes which the military hold
toward politicians. These attitudes seem to bo tho
result of three dominant factors:
1) the pattern of alienation in the two countries;
2) the patterns of the actual eguu3 d'etat and the
events of tho immediate post-coup period;
3) the problems facing the military governments.
In Ghana, the patterns of relationships which
resulted from the factors listed was one of close bur^
AAUcratic-miIn tary co-operation throughout the period
of military rule. Tho pattern of alienation prior to the
coup had been one in which the professional public
servants had been similiarly estranged by the political
structure. The political structure was the O.P.P.; tho
direction of the coup meant the removal of the O.P.P.,
since there were no other political parties In Ghana
at the time of the coup. The aims of the military gov
ernment had been the rehabilitation of the economy and
the restructuring of politics, with a view towards
the return to civilian rule* That is, the military gov
ernment may have viewed itself as only transitional,
performing a necessary technical role to right previous
imbalances. It would probably not have viewed politio-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

?8

isms as being suited to this short term role, allocating
to them the more long term political educational role,
preparatory to the politicians once more taking control.
In addition, the country had already experienced the
manner in which an independence party held on to the
reins of government.

The military may have been guard

ing against a similiar occurrence after the turnover
of power to the politicians. However, the bureaucracy
were considered to have a proper role in the government,
and were alloted a definite legitimate place, handling
all governmental functions not performed by the N.I.C.,
In the initial period of government, the bureau
cracy played a highly successful role in the solution
of the emergency problems facing the military government.
Also, the bureaucrats were best suited to assist the
N.L.C. in solving the long-term problems. The primary
goals of the N.L.C. were to solve the economic problems
previously described. The H.L.C. expected the bureau
cracy, as specialists in the area of economics,to perform
the duties of an advisory body. The nature of the econ
omic problems meant that no politically explosive issues
would have to be faced, and the politicians who returned
to Ghana following the coup could bo left in peripheral
roles, leaving tho dominant positions to the military
and the bureaucracy.
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In Nigeria, the interaction of these three factors
resulted in a different pattern of bureaucratic-military
relations. During the pre-coup period, alienation in
Nigeria had been selective, and had varied in Intensity
within groups in the military and the bureaucracy. The
military and bureaucratic members from the eastern region
were the most alienated. Since the coup or mutiny resulted
in eastern officers dominating the military government,
and since the coun had been directed against the northern
politicians who had dominated the federal government,
politicians would not logically be assigned places in
the military government. With the eastern dominated
civil service, the bureaucrats were assigned full part
nership in the
utable

governing of the country, a move attrib

either bo ethnicity or necessity.

Furthermore,

the Ironsi government had a conception of the problems
facing Nigeria which did not include a role for tho
politician. As a highly alienated group, the eastern
military leaders had a view that the problems of Nigeria
could be solved by unifying the state,altering the
ructure to exclude the corrupt politician, and elim
inating the source of the politicians"power, the regions.
In the destruction of the politicians" power, the bureau
crats would appear to the military as those best suited
to assist in the aim.
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The Gowon government, on the other hand, was
composed of those less alienated by the politicians,
and who had a higher conception of the role of the
politician in government.

The second coup had an effect

on the conception of the role of the bureaucrat. The
failure of the Ironsi regime, evidenced by the unrest
and riots of May and June,l966, was detrimental to the
image of the military government as that best able to
solve Nigeria’s problems. Since the bureaucrats were
closely allied with the Ironsi regime, this would be
regarded as a failure on the part of the bureaucracy as
well. This failure would restrict the role which the
military government would be willing to assign to the
bureaucrats.
A further influence on the changes in roles
assigned by the Gowon government oanhbe.linked to the
new government's conception of the problems facing the
country. By the failure of the unification decree, it
was evident that a unified state was not the answer to
Nigeria's problems. Because of the diversity of the
country, it appeared evident that a federation was the
only other answer. Further, the reaction to the unification
decree had demonstrated the politically explosive nature
of the problem. Since the bureaucracy had failed to
perform the role assigned to it by the Ironsi regime.
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by not advising the government of this political aspect,
the Gowon government co-opted experts in the field of
politics into its ranks. However, in order that the
alienated groups would not have further cause for dis
satisfaction, the 'clean* politicians were used rather
than the previously powerful governmental leaders.
Although the nature of the problems facing the
military governments appears the key factor to the
explanation of the different attitudes, the other two
factors were contributory. The patterns of alienation,
the events of the actual coups and the events of the
immediate post-coup period were instrumental in defining
the boundaries from which the military could co-opt
support. That is , because of these two factors, the
military's choice of supporting groups was restricted,
with the actual choice being determined by the problems
facing the military, and the military's conception of
those best suited to the solution of the problems at
hand.
It therefore appears that the most important
factor affecting the variation in patterns of relation
ships was the nature of the problems facing the mil
itary governments. In Ghana,the economic problems domin
ated, with the political problems being only a minor
segment of the overall patterns. Therefore the military
could maintain its alliance with the bureaucracy, and

..&ÈL
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relegate the politicians to minor roles until the process
of returning to civilian rule had been initiated.
In Nigeria, on the other hand, the problems had been
predominately political in nature. Because the bureau
crats could not fill roles which were both political and
controversial, politicians were brought into the military
government, with the bureaucrats in subsidiary, though
necessary, positions.
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